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The Middle Class Fourth Amendment
Craig Bradleyt
During October Term 2000 the Supreme Court decided
five major Fourth Amendment cases. In chronological
order they are: Indianapolis v. Edmond1  (the drug
roadblock case), Illinois v. McArthur2 (involving search
warrant execution), Ferguson v. City of Charleston' (the
maternity drug testing case), Atwater v. City of Lago Vista4
(the soccer mom seatbelt arrest case), and Kyllo v. United
States5 (the thermal imaging case). In October Term 2001,
the Court decided five more, somewhat less significant,
cases: United States v. Arvizu (reasonable suspicion for a
stop), United States v. Knights7 (warrantless search of
probationer's house), United States v. Drayton8 (consent
search), Kirk v. Louisiana9  (exigent circumstances
exception to the warrant requirement), and Board of
Education v. Earls.10  Because of the unusual voting
lineups in some of these cases, it may be thought that the
Court was simply deciding each case as it came along,
according to the predilections of an ever-shifting majority,
rather than adhering to any larger theme.
This article will argue that there is actually a
strikingly consistent theme to the Court's decisions in
t James Louis Calamaras Professor of Law, Indiana University
(Bloomington) School of Law. An earlier draft of this paper was presented at the
meeting of the Law and Society Association, Budapest, Hungary, July 2001. The
author thanks Professors Richard Frase, Joseph Hoffmann, Christopher Slobogin
and George Thomas for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article.
1. 531 U.S. 32 (2000).
2. 531 U.S. 326 (2001).
3. 532 U.S. 67 (2001).
4. 532 U.S. 318 (2001).
5. 533 U.S. 27 (2001). A sixth case, Arkansas v. Sullivan, 536 U.S. 769 (2001)
was a per curiam opinion reaffirming that pretext stops don't violate the Fourth
Amendment as Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996) had previously held.
6. 534 U.S. 266 (2002).
7. 534 U.S. 112 (2001).
8. 536 U.S. 194 (2002).
9. 536 U.S. 635 (2002).
10. 536 U.S. 822 (2002).
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criminal procedure over the last several Terms.
Recognition of this theme can explain what types of cases
the Court is taking, what the outcome of those cases has
been and what the outcome of future cases might be. I will
further contend that the Court's choice of cases, as well as
its results, represent a distinctive character of the Court
from the mid-1990s, when the current makeup of the Court
was established with the retirement of Justices White (the
last remaining Warren Court Justice) and Blackmun, and
the arrival of Justices Ginsburg and Breyer.1  This
differentiates it from both the activist Warren Court of the
sixties and the "reactivist"12 Burger/Rehnquist Court of the
seventies, eighties and early nineties. Finally I will
question whether the Court's approach is the best way to
resolve Fourth Amendment cases.
The theme, followed with surprising consistency, albeit
by shifting majorities of the Court, is this: The Court is
resistant to new exercises of the power of criminal law
enforcement (in contrast to various civil enforcement
schemes)," but is very reluctant to interfere with police
when they are acting with probable cause. 4 Thus, in the
five October Term 2000 cases cited in the first paragraph,
the Court struck down the Indianapolis drug roadblock, the
Charleston maternity drug testing program and the
warrantless use of a thermal imaging machine on the
ground that these were impermissible expansions of the
scope of criminal law enforcement. By contrast, in Atwater,
11. I do not, however, claim that it was the arrival of these two particular
Justices that necessarily turned the tide.
12. The term "reactivist" should not be confused with "reactionary" because,
while the driving force of the Burger Court was to "react" to Warren Court
opinions, and not to extend them, it also did not overrule them, as a "reactionary"
Court would have done.
13. See discussion, supra text accompanying notes 140-42, of "suspicionless
searches where the program was designed to serve 'special needs beyond the
normal need for law enforcement,'" in Edmond, 531 U.S. at 451-52, including
school drug tests, traffic control roadblocks, etc.
14. When the police are acting with reasonable suspicion rather than probable
cause, the Court has scrutinized their behavior rather carefully to ensure that a
"stop" has not been turned into an "arrest." E.g., Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491
(1983).
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they upheld the custodial arrest of a woman in Texas for
failing to wear her seatbelt, despite heavily criticizing the
policeman in the individual case, on the ground that, since
the arrest was based on probable cause, there was no cause
for "finicking" over the specifics. Likewise, in McArthur,
the Court refused to condemn the exclusion of the
defendant from his home while the police sought a search
warrant. As will be seen, cases from the last several Terms
have followed this same pattern.15 The effect of this theme
has been that the Court has created a "middle class"
Fourth Amendment: one that protects the average citizen
from interference by police as he goes about his daily
business, but does little to protect the rights of criminal
suspects once they fall into police clutches.16
Any consideration of Supreme Court doctrine must
recognize that the Republicans have held a majority on the
Court since the arrival of Justice Powell in 1972."
However, it must also be noted that the nature of current
society has an important impact on the Court's opinions,
because "the times" affect both which party is in power, and
hence who is nominated to the Supreme Court, as well as
how individual Justices perceive the issues before them.
In particular, there are two aspects, or one aspect with
two parts, that distinguish the present day from the days of
the "criminal procedure revolution" of the 1960s Warren
Court. The first of these is that legal discrimination
15. In focusing on these cases, and deciding them the way it has, the Court
could be said to be emphasizing the general 'reasonableness" requirement of the
Fourth Amendment, rather than its more specific provisions, as Professor Amar
has suggested they do. Akhil Reed Amar, The Constitution and Criminal
Procedure: First Principles 32-37 (1997). However, Atwater, saying essentially,
.even unreasonable arrests are okay on probable cause," certainly does not seem
to adopt Professor Amar's suggestion.
16. There are, of course, a few exceptions to this trend, such as Richards v.
Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385 (1997), in which the Court imposed a general "knock and
announce" requirement on the execution of search warrants. As will be discussed
however, other cases, such as the "consent search" case, United States v. Drayton,
536 U.S. 194 (2002), discussed infra text accompanying notes 151-56, which may
appear to be exceptions, are not.
17. In that year, Powell replaced the Democrat Hugo Black. William
Rehnquist's replacement of the Republican John Harlan in the same year did not
affect the political balance.
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against minorities has, essentially, disappeared. This is
not to say that de facto discrimination never occurs-the
recent racial profiling controversy in New Jersey illustrates
how police may discriminate against minorities either
individually, or as a matter of unwritten departmental
policy. But statutes and written policies no longer allow
such discrimination. Of course, criminal procedure law
itself was never directly discriminatory. But the Warren
Court recognized that the absence of adequate standards
governing arrests, searches, and interrogations had the
effect of subjecting criminal suspects, particularly members
of minority groups, to arbitrary and unfair treatment at the
hands of the criminal justice system. When this was
combined with laws that explicitly established second class
status for various minority groups, there was little check
on police abuses. This has been greatly reduced by the
"code of criminal procedure" introduced by the Warren
Court.1 8
The second, and closely related, aspect of current
society is the political power of minorities, especially
blacks. While illegal immigrants may make up a "discrete
and insular" minority that lacks political power in the
United States, black and Hispanic citizens do not. Black
political power in particular is regularly exercised, for
example, to get states to enact the Martin Luther King
holiday, to delete the Confederate symbol from their flags,
etc. Likewise, President Bush's July 2001 proposal that
illegal (primarily Mexican) immigrants be granted "guest
worker" status was said to be an effort to attract Hispanic
voters to the Republican party.19
Perhaps even more important than voting power is the
fact that, unlike the 1960s, blacks today are represented in
every phase of the political, and criminal justice, structure.
18. The existence and shortcomings of this informal "code," as well as the
concerns for racial injustice that animated the Warren Court are the subject of
Craig M. Bradley, The Failure of the Criminal Procedure Revolution (1993)
[hereinafter Bradley, Failure]. See also, Michael Klarman, The Racial Origins of
Modem Criminal Procedure, 99 Mich. L. Rev. 48 (2000).
19. ABC News (ABC television broadcast, July 16, 2001).
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There are so many black police, police chiefs, prosecutors,
judges, mayors, legislators, and congressmen that the sort
of blatant discrimination by state officials that inspired
such Supreme Court decisions as Heart of Atlanta Motel v.
United States20  and Klopfer v. North Carolina21  is
impossible, if not unthinkable. The public/political outcry
when apparently discriminatory conduct by police does
occur, such as the Rodney King and Amidou Diallo cases,
further illustrates that Supreme Court action is neither
needed, nor likely to be very helpful. That is, a change in
criminal procedure doctrine, which the Supreme Court
does, is not as efficacious in dealing with such police
behavior as is reorganizing the police department,
increasing training, punishing and prosecuting the officers
involved, etc.
This fundamental societal shift should have an effect
on Supreme Court opinions and it has no doubt influenced
both the Court's thinking and its makeup. It contributed to
the Court's refusal, beginning in the 1970s, to extend,
though not to overrule, the "criminal procedure revolution"
of the Warren Court. However, until their retirements in
1990 and 1991, respectively, Justices William Brennan and
Thurgood Marshall steadfastly maintained the deep
distrust of state and local police officials that led them to
virtually never vote for the government in police procedure
cases." During that same period, the conservative Justices
Burger and Rehnquist were almost as likely to be obdurate
20. 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (unanimously rejecting claim of hotel that it should be
free to forbid black guests because the public accommodations section of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 was unconstitutional).
21. 386 U.S. 213 (1967) (In this case, police beat and arrested petitioner and
others who had attempted to peacefully integrate a segregated restaurant. The
prosecutor then repeatedly continued the case, rather than bringing it to trial.
The Court held that the Sixth Amendment's Speedy Trial guarantee applied to
the states, and had been violated here.).
22. For a detailed discussion of Brennan's and Marshall's voting record in
police procedure cases (i.e., Fourth and Fifth Amendment, as opposed to Sixth
Amendment cases which mainly affect the post-investigative process), see, Craig
Bradley and Joseph Hoffmann, "Be Careful What You Ask For": The 2000
Presidential Election, the U.S. Supreme Court, and the Law of Criminal
Procedure, 76 Ind. L.J. 889 (2001).
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in the other direction, feeling that the Warren Court had
gone too far in extending the rights of criminals vis-t-vis
the societal need for effective law enforcement.
Since Brennan's and Marshall's retirements, and the
subsequent arrival of the more moderate Democratic
Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, Supreme Court criminal
procedure law has itself become more moderate with both
conservatives and liberals more willing to reach
consensus. 23 In other words, the great theme of the Warren
Court-that the criminal justice system had to be
massively reformed to protect the constitutional rights of
all citizens-no longer lies behind Supreme Court criminal
procedure decisions, nor even behind the dissents.
Similarly, the theme of the '70s and '80s-How much shall
we accept or reverse the Warren Court?-also seems to
have largely expired. 4 We don't see dissenters referring to
Warren Court positions as if they were the received wisdom
straight from the framers' mouths, or predicting the demise
of civilization as we know it, if the majority view were
adopted, as Brennan and Marshall were wont to do.
23. Professor Seidman agrees that this consensus exists, but characterizes it
quite differently: "The recent 'liberal' Clinton appointees to the Supreme Court
seem as unfriendly to criminal procedure liberalism as their conservative
colleagues. . . ." Louis Michael Seidman, Akhil Amar and the (Premature?)
Demise of Criminal Procedure Liberalism, 107 Yale L.J. 2281, 2282 (1998).
24. Just as I am arguing that there are, in effect, "two" Rehnquist Courts in
criminal procedure, so Professor Yale Kamisar argued, in 1983, that there were
"two" Warren Courts, with the later years being more moderate, as exemplified by
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), and "two" Burger Courts, again becoming more
moderate as time went by (and as conservative outrage at the Warren Court
faded). Yale Kamisar, The Warren Court (Was It Really So Defense-Minded?),
The Burger Court (Is It Really So Prosecution-Oriented?), and Police
Investigatory Practices, in The Burger Court: The Counter-revolution that Wasn't
67-68 (Vincent Blasi ed., 1983).
25. E.g. in California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988), holding that police
could search a curbside trash can without a warrant, Brennan's dissent, joined by
Marshall, declared that the "Court paints a grim picture of our society. It depicts
a society in which local authorities may . . . monitor [citizens] arbitrarily and
without judicial oversight-a society that is not prepared to recognize as
reasonable an individual's expectation of privacy in the most private of personal
effects...." Id. at 55-56. Likewise in Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989),
holding that a helicopter flying 400 feet over the defendant's house and viewing
marijuana growing in a greenhouse was not a search, Brennan, dissenting (joined
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Likewise, dissenters from the right don't generally insist
that the police will be incapable of effective law
enforcement as a result of the majority's opinion, though
remnants of such thinking continue to appear on both
sides. Finally, we see frequent votes contra to ideological
type, suggesting that there is no particular ideological
theme to which many individual Justices are devoted.
It is particularly striking that this trend is occurring in
criminal procedure at the same time that the Court seems
increasingly fragmented and disputatious as to other parts
of its docket. As New York Times Supreme Court
correspondent Linda Greenhouse observed,
[Alt the Supreme Court last [2000] term, "5 to 4" became a
judicial way of life. From the presidential election ... to
workplace arbitration, to tobacco advertising to the
ownership of land under an Idaho lake, the justices were
deeply, irrevocably divided.
One-third of the term's 79 cases were decided by 5-4
votes.., a higher proportion than [at] any time in
memory.26
Just why the Court is singing in relative harmony in
criminal procedure is hard to say. As noted, civil rights
concerns are simply not as intense as they once were.
Another reason may be that decreasing crime rates, which
have removed crime from the political front burner, have
also cooled the justices' ardor. No one is concerned about
by Marshall and Stevens), balefully quoted George Orwell's 1984: "Big Brother is
Watching You." Id. at 446.
26. Linda Greenhouse, Ideas & Trends: Divided They Stand; The High Court
and the Triumph of Discord, N.Y. Times, July 15, 2001, § 4 (Week in Review), at
1. Three of the criminal procedure cases decided in October Term 2000 were by a
5-4 vote. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, was 5-4 but, as will be discussed,
infra text accompanying notes 74-77, this did not represent any deep ideological
split. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, did generate some heat but it
came from Justice O'Connor complaining about Justice Souter's pro-police
decision. Finally, Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, was a 5-4 decision along
predictable ideological lines, but was on a rather technical aspect of criminal
procedure law. Thus, while Ms. Greenhouse is correct that 5-4 decisions
frequently are an indication of ideological tension on the Court, that does not
seem to be true of the criminal procedure cases.
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what a prospective justice's views on crime may be, and
since none of the justices have been criminal lawyers, their
views on criminal procedure issues are not likely to have
solidified when they reached the Court.2 v
Another reason may be that no bloc of justices has any
particular ideological agenda as to these issues. In
particular, Chief Justice Rehnquist, a vigorous opponent of
Warren Court holdings, and steadfast supporter of police
prerogatives when he joined the Court, has frequently
joined and written pro-defendant decisions, including, most
notably, authoring the 7-2 decision in Dickerson v. United
States," upholding the constitutional validity of Miranda v.
Arizona. This likely reflects his view both that significant
limits on the Warren Court initiatives have already been
achieved 29 as well as his desire to "lead the Court" as Chief
Justice. ° On a different note, libertarian tendencies on the
part of Justices Scalia and Thomas may cause them to be
suspicious of claims of new government authority to
intrude on the lives of individuals, as their votes against
the government in the Kyllo (thermal imaging) case
suggest.
27. By contrast, "Richard Nixon made the Supreme Court's criminal
procedure doctrine the centerpiece of his presidential campaign, declaring that
Court decisions "had weaken(ed) the peace forces as against the criminal forces in
this country.'" Bradley, Failure, supra note 18, at 30 (quoting Fred P. Graham,
The Self-Inflicted Wound 15 (1970)). Nixon then appointed Warren Burger, one of
the Warren Court's most outspoken critics, especially as to the Miranda decision,
as Chief Justice.
28. 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
29. Shortly before he became Chief Justice, Justice Rehnquist averred that,
whereas he had come to the Court anxious to cut back on what he considered
some of the Warren Court excesses in criminal procedure, he considered the then
current law "more evenhanded now than when I came on the Court." John A.
Jenkins, The Partisan, N.Y. Times, March 3, 1985, § 6 (Magazine) at 28.
In penning the opinion for a seven-two majority in Dickerson, Chief Justice
Rehnquist reassured the legal community and the nation at large that this
pillar of the Warren Court's criminal procedure [doctrine] would remain
standing.
Michael C. Dorf and Barry Friedman, Shared Constitutional Interpretation, 2000
Sup. Ct. Rev. 61.
30. See Rehnquist, Chief Justices I Never Knew, 3 Hastings Const. L.Q. 637
(1976) on the role of the Chief Justice.
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But if the perceived moral imperatives that animated
the Warren and Burger Courts are missing, the question
arises whether there is any theme that can explain current
criminal procedure law. Is this a "minimalist" Court, as
Professor Sunstein has argued, simply "settling the case
before it" and "avoiding clear rules and final resolutions?"31
While every decision is to some extent based on its own
facts, current doctrine certainly goes further than this. The
Justices are well aware that they are creating rules for
police to follow, not just deciding individual cases. The
majority made this point with unusual frankness in
upholding the custodial arrest of a woman for driving
without a seatbelt in Atwater v. City of Lago Vista:
If we were to derive a rule exclusively to address the
uncontested facts of this case, Atwater [the arrestee] might
well prevail .... But we have traditionally recognized that
a responsible Fourth Amendment [doctrine] is not well
served by standards requiring sensitive case-by-case
determinations of government need, lest every discretionary
judgment in the field be converted into an occasion for
constitutional review.2
Criminal procedure law is unique in constitutional
doctrine. Supreme Court decisions about, for example,
whether school prayer will be allowed, or whether a civic
Christmas display is appropriate, are law for lawyers, not
police. A city can consult its attorneys after a Supreme
Court decision comes down to decide, at leisure, whether
the city's anticipated school activities or Christmas
displays square with a recent Court decision. And, if the
lawyers have guessed wrong, then a court may make the
city alter its practices in some way, but no serious damage
is done.
When the Supreme Court decides a criminal procedure
case, by contrast, within the next month, a thousand
31. Cass R. Sunstein, One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism on the
Supreme Court, at ix (1999).
32. 532 U.S. at 346-47.
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criminal cases may arise that pose variations on the issue
just decided. The police must deal with these issues on the
street, without the benefit of legal advice. If the police
apply the law incorrectly, then many of those criminals
may have to be released. Consequently, we would hope
that the Court would try to declare "clear rules" in criminal
procedure cases, rather than simply indulging their power
to right a wrong in an individual case.3
Still, a conviction that clear rules are required in
criminal procedure cases so that the police will know what
to do, is not a theory that is of much help in predicting how
the Court may decide the next case, unlike the guiding
egalitarian principles of the Warren Court. Nor does it
suggest what areas the Court might be likely to emphasize,
which the reactive theme of the Burger Court did to an
extent.34
This article will consider the criminal procedure cases
for the last eight years, during which time we have had a
stable Court, Justice Breyer having replaced Justice
Blackmun beginning in October Term 1994."5 In the
current climate, one would expect to find no particular
trend toward either defendants or the government. In fact,
decisions over this period involving police procedures have
been almost equally divided.3 6 Likewise, unanimous
33. It is the Supreme Court's (or any court's) inherent inability to create clear
rules that was the principal theme of The Failure of the Criminal Procedure
Revolution, supra note 18.
34. The most anticipated decision of the Burger Court was certainly whether
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), would be overruled and, if not, how
much it would be limited or extended. The Burger Court devoted a great deal of
its time to cases raising these issues, even though it left the final declaration of
whether Miranda would remain good law to the Rehnquist Court in Dickerson,
530 U.S. 428. Likewise, the extent to which the exclusionary rule of Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), would be applied in various situations (e.g., to
impeachment evidence, to grand jury proceedings, to searches where police had a
warrant, etc.) was another, predictable, area of emphasis. Finally, carving out
substantial areas of police investigative activity that were "not searches," and
hence not subject to any Court-imposed limitations, was a recurring theme of the
Burger Court.
35. Justice Breyer was commissioned on September 30, 1994. 512 U.S. 1270
(1994).
36. For the government: United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194 (2002);
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opinions going either way are not unusual. 7 And, while
there is a more conservative and a more liberal bloc,
individual Justices frequently vote counter to their
apparent ideological leanings based on the issue before
them, even as shifting majorities tend to sound the theme
that is the subject of this article.
Thus, Justice Souter, usually a member of the "liberal
bloc," authored the 5-4 opinion in Atwater, while the
generally more conservative Justice O'Connor dissented.38
In Dickerson v. United States,39 the Chief Justice wrote for
a 7-2 majority striking down a federal statute that
Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266 (2002); Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001); Atwater, 532 U.S. 318
(2001); McArthur, 531 U.S. 326 (2001); Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769 (2001);
Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162 (2001); Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000);
Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465 (1999); Florida v. White, 526 U.S. 559 (1999);
United States v. Ramirez, 523 U.S. 65 (1998); Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33
(1996); Pennsylvania Bd. of Prob. and Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357 (1998);
Richards v. Wisconsin 520 U.S. 385 (1997); Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806
(1996); Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938 (1996); Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1
(1995).
For the defendant: Kirk v. Louisiana, 536 U.S. 635 (2002); Kyllo v. United States
533 U.S. 27 (2001); Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001); Dickerson
v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000); Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266. (2000); Bond
v. United States, 529 U.S. 334 (2000); Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32
(2000); City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999); Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S.
603 (1999); Flippo v. West Virginia, 528 U.S. 11 (1999); Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S.
113 (1998); Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927 (1995).
Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83 (1998), holding that a business visitor lacked
standing to raise a Fourth Amendment claim, is not counted because standing
does not involve approval or disapproval of police procedures. Ornelas v. United
States, 517 U.S. 690 (1996), involving reasonable suspicion for auto steps was not
counted because it involved the deference to be given to state court
determinations in federal habeas as did Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99
(1995). Likewise, Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995) and
Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002) approving school policies of testing
certain students for drug use were not counted. They are Fourth Amendment
cases, but don't involve police procedures as the results were not given to the
police, unlike Ferguson above.
37. Ramirez and Whren, for the government and Kirk, J.L., Knowles, Wilson
v. Layne, Wilson v. Arkansas, and Richards for the defendant, were unanimous.
In Dyson, a per curiam opinion, Justice Breyer, for two dissenters, agreed with
the majority's view of the law and dissented only because the respondents counsel
did not file a brief (because "counsel is not a member of this Court's bar and did
not wish to become one. . . .") 527 U.S. at 468.
38. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001).
39. 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
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purported to overrule Miranda v. Arizona,40 deserting his
conservative allies, Justices Scalia and Thomas, who
dissented. In Bond v. United States,41 the Chief Justice
again wrote for a 7-2 majority, holding that the squeezing
of luggage by police on a bus was a "search" subject to
Fourth Amendment protection. The two dissenters were
the ideological odd couple of Justices Breyer and Scalia.
Most striking of all is the 5-4 decision in Kyllo v. United
States42 where the majority, disapproving warrantless use
of a thermal imager to detect marijuana grow lights inside
a house, consisted of Justices Scalia, Souter, Thomas,
Ginsburg and Breyer, with Justices Stevens, O'Connor,
Kennedy and Chief Justice Rehnquist in dissent.
Beyond the notion that part of the Court's job in
criminal procedure is to declare rules for police to follow in
future cases, is there any other guiding principle that can
be discerned in the Court's recent cases?In the last eight
years, the Court has, with the exception of the Dickerson
case, largely ignored interrogation law.43  Likewise, the
requisites for a search warrant or other probable cause
searches have not been emphasized. 4 Instead, most of the
cases can be divided into two groups: Those in which
defendants sought to limit the way police behaved when
they were acting with probable cause, which defendants
rather consistently lost, and those in which police sought
to expand their investigative powers, which defendants
consistently won.
40. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
41. 529 U.S. 334 (2000).
42. 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
43. One other case involved interrogation issues. Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162,
refused, by a 5-4 vote, to extend the right to counsel during interrogation to an
uncharged offense that was factually intertwined with a charged offense for which
the defendant already had counsel.
44. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, White, 526 U.S. 559, and Labron, 518, U.S. 938,
involved the requisites for a probable cause auto search., Ramirez, 523 U.S. 65,
Richards, 520 U.S. 385, and Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, involved "no-
knock" execution of search warrants. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, and Wilson v.
Layne, 526 U.S. 603, decided other issues relating to execution of search
warrants.
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As noted, October Term 2000 was particularly rich in
Fourth Amendment cases. All five of these results could
have been predicted by the above analysis. The first case,
chronologically, was City of Indianapolis v. Edmond.45 In
Edmond, the Court, by a 6-3 vote along "predictable"
ideological lines46 struck down a narcotics roadblock which
subjected motorists stopped to a brief inspection by police
and sniff of the car's exterior by a drug-sniffing dog. The
Court disapproved of this roadblock as being for "law
enforcement" purposes, as opposed to roadblocks for
impaired or unlicensed drivers which were for "traffic
control" purposes. Thus, the ability of police to interfere
with people as to whom they had no evidence of criminal
wrongdoing, and no additional regulatory reason for
approaching, such as traffic law enforcement, was limited:
We cannot sanction stops justified only by the generalized
and ever-present possibility that interrogation and
inspection may reveal that any given motorist has
committed some crime.47
Edmond called a halt to a series of Burger Court cases
that had approved of roadblocks to apprehend illegal
aliens4" and drunk drivers49 and suggested that roadblocks
to check driver's licenses would also be okay.50 Those cases
all involved roadblocks advancing the "imperative of
highway safety""' rather than "detect[ing] evidence of
ordinary criminal wrongdoing. '52  The majority's
willingness to limit Burger Court precedent despite the fact
that, as the Chief Justice pointed out in dissent, the burden
on the motorist was the same in all of these roadblock
45. 531 U.S. 32.
46. That is, the three dissenters were Rehnquist, Scalia and Thomas.
47. 531 U.S. at 44.
48. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
49. Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
50. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 656-57 (1979).
51. 531 U.S. at 39.
52. Id. at 41.
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cases, 3 illustrates the different emphasis of the current
Court compared to that of the recent past.
The second case decided in 2001 was Illinois v.
McArthur,54 an 8-1 decision authored by Justice Breyer.55
In McArthur, the police were present to help a woman
remove her possessions from the marital home without
interference from her husband. As a coup de grace to the
failed marriage, the woman told the police that the
husband had a marijuana stash inside. The police knocked
on the door and asked permission to search, which was
refused. One policeman left to get a search warrant. The
second remained. Since the husband/defendant had by now
exited the trailer,"s the policeman kept him from reentering
unless accompanied by the policeman. The Court held that
while the trailer was "seized" by the police, a "temporary
seizure that was supported by probable cause and was
designed to prevent the loss of evidence while the police
diligently obtained a warrant," was permissible.57 Since
McArthur was a person already subject to a search
warrant, he was not the sort of "reasonable person" whom
the Court is interested in protecting. The notion that the
Court was simply going along with the police's exercise of
established authority, rather than increasing police powers,
was bolstered by the citation of numerous earlier cases
approving of temporary seizures to allow further
investigation58  and the Court's observation that "a
perimeter stakeout to prevent anyone from entering...
and destroying evidence" had previously been approved in
dictum in the 1984 case of Segura v. United States. 9
53. Id. at 48-52 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
54. 531 U.S. 326 (2001).
55. Only Justice Stevens dissented, 531 U.S. at 338.
56. It is unclear whether he exited at the direction of the police or on his own.
People v. McArthur, 713 N.E.2d 93, 94 (Ill. App. Ct., 1999).
57. 531 U.S. at 334.
58. E.g., United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983) (temporary seizure of
luggage for a dog sniff, based on reasonable suspicion, approved).
59. 531 U.S. at 333 (quoting Segura, 468 U.S. 796, 814 (1984)). I have
previously argued that the Court in McArthur ignored the more important issue
of whether the occupants of a home could be removed pending arrival of the
search warrant, rather than kept out if they were already outside. Craig M.
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The third case, decided by a 5-1-3 vote, was Ferguson
v. City of Charleston.6 In Ferguson, maternity patients
who met a hospital profile for suspected drug use were
subjected, without being told, to urine tests for cocaine. If
the tests were positive, the results were turned over to the
police, and the patients were threatened with arrest if they
did not agree to participate in a drug treatment program.6
The court below had approved this testing because "special
needs" had been recognized by the Supreme Court as
justifying "suspicionless" (i.e. a lack of probable cause) drug
tests, despite the fact that they qualified as searches.62
Although Ferguson involved a completely different line
of cases than Edmond, and a particularly compelling
societal goal-the protection of fetuses from harmful
drugs-the Court concluded, as in Edmond, that,
notwithstanding the desirable non-criminal goal of the
program, the primary effect of this program was crime
control.63 Consequently, the taking of the urine samples
was an unconsented "search" without probable cause, in
violation of the Fourth Amendment:
The critical difference between [cases approving no-
probable-cause drug tests] and this one.., lies in the
nature of the "special need" asserted as justification for the
warrantless searches. In each of those earlier cases, the
"special need".., was one divorced from the State's general
interest in law enforcement.64
Bradley, Preserving Evidence Pending a Search Warrant, Trial Mag., June 1,
2001, at 70.
60. 532 U.S. 67 (2001). Justice Kennedy concurred in the result. The three
dissenters here were again Rehnquist, Scalia and Thomas.
61. Id. at 72-73.
62. Id. at 74-75 (citing Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 186 F.3d 469 (4th Cir.,
1999)). The court below had relied on Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515
U.S. 646 (1995); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989); and
Nat'l Treasury Employees v. Van Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989); all of which allowed
suspicionless drug tests due to various "special needs" other than criminal law
enforcement.
63. 532 U.S. 67, 81.
64. Id. at 79.
1138 BUFFALO CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6:1123
While the ultimate goal of the program may well have been
to get the women in question into substance abuse
treatment and off drugs, the immediate objective of the
searches was to generate evidence for law enforcement
purposes in order to meet that goal.6"
The fourth case, and second to be decided for the
government, was Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, a 5-4
decision authored by Justice Souter.6 In Atwater, a woman
was legitimately stopped by the police for driving without
her, or her children's, seatbelts being fastened. State law
allowed a custodial arrest for this offense, despite the fact
that incarceration was not a possible penalty. The
policeman did arrest her, whereupon she was handcuffed,
her car was impounded, she was taken to the police station,
had a "mug shot" taken and was incarcerated for an hour.
She could also have been subjected to searches of her
person 67 and her car" "incident to the arrest," though the
police did not do this.
The majority's primary argument was that the police
need clear rules to follow and that any rule other than
"police can arrest whenever state law allows" would be too
fuzzy.69 Specifically, Souter rejected the dissent's proposal
that arrest should follow the commission of a "fine-only"
offense, only if "the officer is 'able to point to specific and
articulable facts which... reasonably warrant... ' a full
custody arrest."" This test, in the majority's view, was
fraught with complexity, since the policeman may not know
whether the circumstances justifying a full custody arrest
are present.
65. Id. at 82-83 (emphasis the court's).
66. 532 U.S. 318.
67. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
68. See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
69. Thus the Court continued its insistence that Fourth Amendment law, i.e.,
the reasonableness of a given search or seizure, does not depend on the nature or
seriousness of the crime being investigated. For a thoughtful critique of this
approach, see William J. Stuntz, O.J. Simpson, Bill Clinton, and the
Transsubstantive Fourth Amendment, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 842 (2001).
70. 532 U.S. 318, 366 (O'Connor, J., dissenting (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 21 (1968))).
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Since the dissent's test was drawn from Terry v.
Ohio71, the Warren Court's famous "stop and frisk "case,
which requires the police to make a similar, sometimes
difficult, judgment, the difficulty of the test cannot be the
full answer. The Court's distinction of Terry is significant:
Terry ... is not to the contrary. Terry certainly supports a
more firely tuned approach to the Fourth Amendment when
police act without the traditional justification that either a
warrant (in the case of a search) or probable cause (in the
case of an arrest) provides;, but ... there is no comparable
cause for finicking when police act with such justification.72
Thus, since in Atwater, as in McArthur, probable cause
that the defendant had committed a crime had already
been established, the Court was unwilling to impose a
further set of restrictions on how the police might treat her,
even though it admitted that "the physical incidents of
[her] arrest were merely gratuitous humiliations imposed
by a police officer who was (at best) exercising extremely
poor judgment."73
The final Fourth Amendment case of the 2000 Term is
Kyllo v. United States. 74 In Kyllo, the police used a thermal
imaging machine to examine the outside of petitioner's
house and, finding that excessive heat was being released,
concluded that Kyllo was growing marijuana inside. They
used the information to obtain a warrant, searched the
house and, finding marijuana, arrested Kyllo.
71. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
72. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 347 n.16. The Court was also influenced by their
belief that the police would not abuse this power, because they have not done so
in the past, a position with which I strongly disagreed in Craig M. Bradley,
Minor-Offense Arrests Get Green Light in Seat Belt Case, Trial Mag., August 1,
2001, at 66. For detailed and insightful criticism of Atwater, see Thomas Davies,
The Fictional Character of Law-and-Order Originalism: A Case Study of the
Distortions and Evasions of Framing-Era Arrest Doctrine in Atwater v. Lago
Vista, 37 Wake Forest L. Rev. 239 (2002); Richard Frase, What Were They
Thinking? Fourth Amendment Unreasonableness in Atwater v. Lago Vista, 71
Fordham L. Rev. 379 (2002).
73. Id. at 346-47.
74. 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
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A very strange majority of Scalia, Souter, Thomas,
Ginsburg, and Breyer struck down this search on the
ground that obtaining any information from the interior of
the house through the means of a technical device violated
the Fourth Amendment. This was consistent with an
earlier case, United States v. Karo 5 where the Court had
held that using an electronic beeper to ascertain that a
drum of chemicals was in a house was a Fourth
Amendment violation, despite the fact that the beeper
conveyed no further information than its presence in the
house. Again, although the police obviously had suspicions
about Kyllo, these suspicions were not advanced to justify
the use of the machine. Rather, the government argued
that use of the machine was "not a search" under the
Fourth Amendment. 6 If it were not a "search" the machine
could be used outside anybody's house, even a Supreme
Court Justice's. The Court, consistently with its reluctance
to allow police to interfere in new ways with innocent
civilians, struck it down.
All nine Justices agreed that the use of a machine that
disclosed what people were actually doing in the house
would have violated the Fourth Amendment." The only
dispute was whether this crude machine, which simply
showed that a lot of heat was being released from the
house, was enough to violate the Constitution. The
majority concluded that it was. The unanimous view of the
Court, that machines cannot be used to spy on what goes
75. 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
76. An alternative argument for the government, that this was a limited
search, which could have been justified by reasonable suspicion like a Terry frisk,
might have carried the day, given that the machine disclosed very little of what
was going on in the house.
77. There is ... a distinction of constitutional magnitude between through-
the-wall surveillance that gives the observer or listener direct access to a
private area, on the one hand, and the thought processes used to draw
inferences from information in the public domain, on the other hand....
[The] observations [in this case] were made with a fairly primitive thermal
imager that gathered data exposed on the outside of petitioner's home but
did not invade any constitutionally protected interest in privacy.
Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 41 (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and
O'Connor and Kennedy, JJ.).
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on in people's houses without a warrant, is more significant
than the disagreement over whether this particular
machine provided enough information to constitute a
"search." Thus the peculiar voting lineup may be
considered at least as much technological as it is
ideological.
When the burden on the individual in these five cases
is considered, Atwater suffered the most. Being arrested is
clearly worse than being briefly stopped at a roadblock
(Edmond), having your urine examined for cocaine without
your knowledge (Ferguson), having the "heat profile" of
your house measured by a machine (Kyllo), or being
excluded from your house pending the arrival of a search
warrant (McArthur). As noted, the potential burden on
Atwater was even greater since both she and her car could
have been searched.78
But the Court upheld Atwater's arrest, as well as
McArthur's exclusion, consistently with the theory
advanced here, while the government lost the other three
cases. Atwater was not an innocent person subjected to
police investigation. Rather, she was legitimately under
police control. The only issue was whether the Court
should create a new rule for police to follow governing her
subsequent treatment, i.e. limiting police power to perform
custodial arrests. The majority treated this case the same
as United States v. Robinson,79 where the Court allowed a
full search incident to arrest for a traffic violation, with the
Court refusing to interfere with police exercise of
discretion.8 0  Likewise, McArthur's trailer was already
subject to being searched with a warrant. The only issue
was police treatment of him pending its arrival. Thus,
78. Of course, had drugs actually been found in any of these cases, the
suspects would have been subject to arrest. But I'm referring to the burden
imposed by the search or seizure itself, not what might have happened had the
police actually discovered contraband.
79. 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
80. "[A] responsible Fourth Amendment balance is not well served by
standards requiring sensitive, case-by-case determinations of government need,
lest every discretionary judgment in the field be converted into an occasion for
constitutional review." 532 U.S. 318, 347 (citing Robinson, 414 U.S. at 234-235).
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while the Court is consistently suspicious of police
justifications for intruding on privacy in new ways, as they
sought to do in Kyllo, Edmond, and Ferguson, it is willing
to support police discretion in deciding how people
legitimately stopped, arrested, or subject to search, should
be treated.
Another pair of recent cases further illustrate this
trend: Whren v. United States"1 and City of Chicago v.
Morales.2 In Morales, the Court, by a 6-3 vote, 3 struck
down the Chicago Gang Congregation Ordinance. This
ordinance prohibited "loitering" in a public place by two or
more people, at least one of whom was a "criminal street
gang member." Loitering was defined as "remain[ing] in
any one place with no apparent purpose." The crime
occurred when such people disobeyed a police officer's order
to disperse.84
Morales is of particular interest, because it shows the
difference in approach between the current Court and a
famous Warren Court case. The Chicago ordinance was
similar to an ordinance declared unconstitutional in
Papachristou v. Jacksonville in 1972 by a unanimous Court
in which the two recently appointed Republican Justices
Rehnquist and Powell did not participate. Thus this was
essentially the last case decided by the Democratic majority
(Douglas, Brennan, Marshall and White, as well as
Republican Stewart) that had, along with (by then retired)
Warren, Fortas, and Black,85 driven the Warren Court.8"
81. 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
82. 527 U.S. 41 (1999). For a fuller discussion of Morales, see Craig M.
Bradley, The Changing Face of Criminal Procedure, Trial Mag., October 1, 1999,
at 84.
83. Rehnquist, C.J., Scalia and Thomas, JJ., dissenting.
84. 527 U.S. at 47.
85. By the time of Papachristou, 405 U.S. 156 (1972), Burger, Blackmun,
Powell and Rehnquist had replaced Warren, Fortas, Black and Harlan,
respectively.
86. There is a potentially significant difference in the Chicago and
Jacksonville ordinances, but the plurality, in striking down the Chicago
ordinance, didn't make much of it. That is that, whereas "vagrancy" was itself a
crime in Jacksonville, the Chicago ordinance only criminalized "loiterers" who
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The Jacksonville ordinance declared a long list of types
of people to be "vagrants" and thus subject to criminal
punishment by virtue of that "vagrancy." The list included,
in addition to various criminal types, "common night
walkers," "persons wandering or strolling around from
place to place without any lawful purpose," and "habitual
loafers."87 The Court, per Justice Douglas, in a paean to
such wanderers as Walt Whitman and Vachel Lindsay,
declared the right to wander around aimlessly to be a part
of the concept of "liberty" protected by the Constitution.ss
However, in addition to this particular right, the Court also
sounded a theme generally applicable to its criminal law
and procedure decisions of the 1960s: that the ordinance
"furnishes a convenient tool for 'harsh and discriminatory
law enforcement by local prosecuting officials against
particular groups deemed to merit their displeasure.'
8 9
Thus Papachristou was one of a long line of cases in which
the Court sought to protect minorities and the poor from
police and prosecutorial abuse: "The rule of law, evenly
applied to minorities as well as majorities, to the poor as
well as the rich, is the great mucilage that holds society
together."9
The ordinance in Morales, by contrast, was enacted at
the behest of inner city residents to protect them against
gang members who "'establish control over identifiable
areas.., by loitering in those areas and intimidating
others from entering those areas; and ... avoid arrest by
committing no offense punishable under existing laws
when they know the police are present."' 91 It was designed
to protect, not to oppress, minorities as well as majorities;
the poor as well as the rich. And far from a unanimous
opinion extolling the right to loaf and hang around on
failed to disperse after being ordered to do so by a policeman, as Justice Thomas
emphasized in dissent. 527 U.S. at 106.
87. 405 U.S. at 158 n.1.
88. 405 U.S. at 164.
89. Id, at 170 (citation omitted).
90. Id. at 171.
91. 527 U.S. at 46 (quoting the city council's findings).
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street corners free from police harassment, Morales gave
rise to six separate opinions with a majority agreeing as to
only a limited holding that this particular ordinance was
vague, while expressing sympathy with the city's plight
and offering helpful suggestions to better achieve the city's
goals.
In Part V of the decision, the only significant part to
which a majority subscribed,92 the Court found that the
ordinance did not "establish minimal guidelines to govern
law enforcement."93 In particular, the Court denounced the
"no apparent purpose" language of the statute, accepting
the finding of the Illinois Supreme Court that this
"provides absolute discretion to police officers to decide
what activities constitute loitering."
94
Indeed, the majority pointed out that, by its terms, the
statute does not apply to those loiterers whom the city
would most like to control: those who do have an apparent
purpose either to "publicize the gang's dominance of certain
territory" or to commit crimes.95
Both the majority and Justice O'Connor's concurrence
offered several suggestions to cities as to how to draft these
ordinances better. The majority observed that an
ordinance that "only applied to loitering [by or with gang
members] that had an apparent harmful purpose or effect"
would be okay,96 as might an ordinance that was limited to
loitering by gang members without the need to show any
apparent purpose. 97
92. Justice Stevens' plurality opinion was fully joined only by Justices Souter
and Ginsburg. Justices O'Connor, Kennedy and Breyer joined only Parts I and II,
which set forth the facts and history of the case, and Part V. Each of these
concurring Justices also wrote a separate opinion. Justice Thomas wrote a
dissenting opinion joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Scalia. Justice Scalia
also wrote a separate dissent.
93. 527 U.S. at 60.
94. Id. at 61 (citation omitted).
95. Id. at 63.
96. Id. at 62.
97. Id. The Court did not discuss the problem of identifying who is a "criminal
street gang member," which is surely not always obvious. See Lanzetta v. New
Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939).
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Justice O'Connor stated her agreement with the
dissent that "some degree of police discretion is necessary
to allow police to 'perform their peacekeeping
responsibilities satisfactorily,"' but felt that this ordinance
permitted "policemen, prosecutors and juries to conduct 'a
standardless sweep ... to pursue their personal
predilections."'98 She noted that "the ordinance here is
unlike a law that directly prohibits the presence of a large
collection of obviously brazen, insistent, and lawless gang
members and hangers-on the public ways that intimidates
residents."99
It is apparent that none of the members of the Court
believed that this was a law designed to oppress minorities,
or non-conformists, like the ordinance struck down in
Papachristou. Rather they were sympathetic to the goals
of the law, recognized that it was designed to protect people
living in "bad" neighborhoods from oppression by criminals
rather than police, and indicated that a similar, but more
carefully drawn law, would meet with their approval. At
the same time, the Court, as it has proved in the other
cases discussed herein, was leery of freewheeling exercise
of discretion by police to hassle people as to whom the
police lacked at least reasonable suspicion that they were
violating the criminal law.
These two principles are at the heart of today's
criminal procedure doctrine: First, that police are not
automatically to be distrusted but second, that their ability
to intrude in new ways on the privacy of otherwise innocent
people must be carefully circumscribed. As the Court
explained in Terry v. Ohio, these cases involve a balancing
of the need for police to deal with citizens in a variety of
non-arrest contexts against "a severe requirement of
specific justification for any intrusion upon protected
personal security ....
In Morales, the Court struck down the statute because
it imbued police with too much discretion, while going out
98. Id. at 65 (citation omitted).
99. Id. at 67 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (internal quotations omitted).
100. Terry, 392 U.S. at 11.
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of its way to indicate that a fair degree of police discretion
was allowable. In Whren v. United States,10' a unanimous
Court, per Justice Scalia, held that vice squad police, who
stopped a car for a traffic violation as a pretext for
investigating whether the car contained drugs102, did not
violate the Fourth Amendment. The more liberal members
of the Court apparently agreed with Justice Scalia that it
would be unworkable to demand that the subjective
intentions of police who, objectively, had probable cause,
(albeit not of a criminal violation) be probed in each case to
determine the true motive for an arrest or stop:
It is of course true that in principle every Fourth
Amendment case, since it turns upon a "reasonableness"
determination, involves a balancing of all relevant factors.
With rare exceptions not applicable here, however, the
result of that balancing is not in doubt where the search or
seizure is based upon probable cause. °3
Had Justices Brennan and Marshall been on the
Court, they would, no doubt, have strenuously objected to
this holding and insisted that, at least where, as in Whren,
local police regulations forbade plainclothes police from
making traffic stops except for "grave" traffic violations,
such pretext stops were unconstitutional.
Morales is arguably overprotective of constitutional
rights. After all, the only burden on a citizen is to disperse
when ordered to do so by a policeman-only failure to
disperse is subject to arrest. Whren is arguably
underprotective of constitutional rights. It encourages
police to follow motorists, whom they lack cause to either
arrest or stop, until they commit some trivial traffic
violation at which time the police may pounce. The burden
on the individual is surely greater in Whren than in
Morales. But, as is characteristic of the recent cases, an
101. 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
102. The officers observed cocaine in plain view when the approached the car.
Id. at 809.
103. Id. at 817.
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evaluation of the burden imposed on the suspects will not
explain the Court's decisions.
The distinction between Whren and Morales is better
seen as based on the fact that the person affected in
Morales was "innocent" as far as the police were concerned.
That is, they lacked even reasonable suspicion to stop him
for a crime. 10 4  By contrast, the suspect in Whren was
legitimately subject to a stop by police due to the traffic
infraction. Given this circumstance, the Court was
unwilling to create secondary rules governing how the
police must treat someone who is already subject their
control.
Consider more of the recent cases. In Ohio v.
Robinette,105 the Court upheld, by an 8-1 vote,0 6 a request of
a highway patrolman for consent to search a car, stopped
for a traffic violation, without informing the suspect that he
was free to go. Since Robinette was already legitimately
stopped by the police, the Court was not troubled by the
fact that he was not informed that he was free to go before
consent was sought. This is consistent with the Court's
refusal to require any prerequisite to consent searches
beyond the vague requirement that they be "voluntary." 7
It is also consistent with the Court's reluctance to impose
secondary rules on police exercising established authority.
Likewise, in Wyoming v. Houghton °s the Court upheld,
6-3,109 the search of a car, on probable cause that the driver
possessed drugs. During the search, the police opened the
handbag of a woman passenger, finding drugs. While
Houghton herself was "innocent" in the eyes of the police,
the Court focused on the previously recognized authority of
the police to search cars and any containers that might be
found therein, on probable cause."0 Again, as long as the
104. They could have been "loiter[ing] near Wrigley Field ... just to get a
glimpse of Sammy Sosa" as the Court put it. 527 U.S. at 60.
105. 592 U.S. 33 (1996).
106. Justice Stevens dissenting.
107. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
108. 526 U.S. 295 (1999).
109. Id. at 309 (Stevens, J., joined by Souter and Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting).
110. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
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police were exercising this established authority, searching
a car on probable cause, the Court was reluctant to limit
how they should do it. A contrary ruling, averred the
Court, would lead to a "bog of litigation" as to whether the
police had reason to believe that a particular container
belonged to a passenger or the driver."'
By contrast, in Bond v. United States,"' the Court
struck down, by a 7-2 vote,"1 a "luggage squeeze" by drug
agents of luggage on a bus to see if it felt like it contained
drugs. They felt a "brick-like object" that turned out to be a
"brick" of methamphetamine. 114  This was a "search"
requiring probable cause ruled the Court. Bond, and his
fellow bus passengers were "innocent," and could not be
subjected to such intrusive police behavior.
When a bus passenger places a bag in an overhead bin, he
expects that other passengers or bus employees may move it
for one reason or another .... He does not expect that other
passengers or bus employees will, as a matter of course, feel
the bag in an exploratory manner." 5
Bond may be seen as limiting the 1983 decision in
United States v. Place,"6 in which the Court held that a dog
sniff of luggage was not a "search," despite language in
Place suggesting that the police behavior in Bond would
not be considered a search either."7 As Justice Breyer
pointed out in dissent,
111. Houghton, 526 U.S. at 305.
112. 529 U.S. 334 (2000).
113. Id. at 339 (Breyer and Scalia, JJ., dissenting).
114. Id. at 336.
115. Id. at 338-39.
116. 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
117. A canine sniff by a well-trained narcotics detection dog does not require
opening the luggage. It does not expose noncontraband items that otherwise
would remain hidden from public view, as does, for example, an officer's
rummaging through the contents of the luggage. Thus the manner in which
information is obtained through this investigative technique is much less
intrusive than a typical search. Moreover, the sniff discloses only the
presence or absence of narcotics, a contraband item.
Id. at 707.
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Surely it is less likely that nongovernmental strangers will
sniff at another's bags (or more to the point, permit their
dogs to do so) than it is that such actors will touch or
squeeze another's personal belongings in the process of
making room for their own.1 '
Bond was clearly vindicating the right of the
reasonable, innocent person not to be subjected to intrusive
police searches when he's minding his own business on a
public conveyance.
Three other cases, Florida v. J.L.,"9 Illinois v.
Wardlow,"° and United States v. Arvisu,121 involved the
issue of whether or not the police had the "reasonable
suspicion" necessary to conduct a stop. As such, these
cases deal with the threshold meaning of the "reasonable
suspicion" requirement rather than the issue of what police
may do when they lack it.122 But these cases also show the
"middle class" orientation of the Court.
In Wardlow, the issue was whether a man, who was
found in a "high crime area"123 created "reasonable
suspicion" when he ran away upon seeing a caravan of
police cars heading toward him. Since a reasonable middle
class person would not do this, it is not surprising that the
Court found that such flight justified a Terry stop.
In Arvizu, several factors prompted a border patrol
agent to stop a van in a remote area thirty miles north of
the Mexican border. A vehicle had triggered sensors
indicating that it was driving around border patrol
checkpoints on the highway. The officer spotted a minivan
which "based on the timing he believed.., was the one
that had tripped the sensors."'24 As the officer approached
the van, the occupants behaved strangely and it appeared
118. 529 U.S. at 341.
119. 529 U.S. 266 (2000).
120. 528 U.S. 119 (2000).
121. 534 U.S. 266 (2002).
122. See also Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325 (1990), and United States v.
Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (1989), for earlier cases dealing with this issue.
123. 528 U.S. at 124.
124. 534 U.S. at 270.
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that the knees of the children in the back "were unusually
high, as if their feet were propped up on some cargo on the
floor." 125 At the last turn before the next checkpoint, the
van turned off onto a road normally used only by four
wheel drive vehicles. 126 Finally the officer ascertained that
the vehicle not local but was registered to an address four
blocks from the border "in an area notorious for alien and
narcotics smuggling."1 27  The officer stopped the vehicle,
asked consent to search, and found 128 pounds of
marijuana.
The Court upheld this stop on the ground that all of
the factors within the officer's knowledge added up to
reasonable suspicion. As the Court demonstrates, no
innocent explanation for defendant's behavior, such as
going for a family picnic, is as consistent with the facts as
the suspicion that the defendant was smuggling something.
The final case is Florida v. J.L. In contrast to Arvizu
and Wardlow, the police had observed no suspicious
behavior. Rather their stop of J.L. was based solely on an
anonymous tip that "a young black male standing at a
particular bus stop and wearing a plaid shirt was carrying
a gun."128 The Court held that such a "bare bones tip" with
no suspicious behavior observed by police to corroborate it,
is insufficient to justify a stop and frisk. As Justice
Kennedy observed, concurring, "The reviewing court cannot
judge the credibility of the informant and the risk of
fabrication becomes unacceptable." 29
Thus, whereas Arvizu and Wardlow had engaged in
suspicious behavior, inconsistent with that of a reasonable
person, J.L. was just standing at a bus stop. The
anonymous tip could have been a "prank" by someone who
"harbored a grudge" against him, or even made up by the




128. 529 U.S. at 268.
129. Id. at 275 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
130. As the dissenters argued in Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 333 (1990)
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Supreme Court Justices and their families) standing at bus
stops, ATM machines or taxi ranks, should not be hassled
by police on the basis of anonymous tips alone.
It could be said that the Court gives "strict scrutiny" to
police claims of new powers to interfere with otherwise
innocent people. By contrast, the Court merely looks for a
"rational basis" for police treatment of people who are
already legally subject to police detainment on probable
cause. But, unlike in Equal Protection law, the designation
of a case to one of these categories should not be expected
to predetermine the outcome.
Consider Knowles v. Iowa. 3' In Knowles a policeman
stopped a speeder and then, though neither probable cause
nor reasonable suspicion were present, searched him
"incident to the arrest" for speeding, even though there
were no plans to take him into custody (unless, of course,
they found drugs). The Court, per Chief Justice Rehnquist,
unanimously struck down this search. Since this case
involved a person already legitimately in police custody due
to the traffic stop, one might have expected the Court to
uphold the search. But while the Court may have applied a
"rational basis" approach here, the police's asserted "need"
to search someone whom they have already concluded was
not worth arresting arguably fails that test.
132
Alternatively, Knowles could be considered "innocent" once
the police had concluded the traffic stop, and, as such,
protected by "strict scrutiny," but this would be
inconsistent with Robinette."'
(Stevens, J., dissenting), "[E]very citizen is subject to being seized and questioned
by any officer who is prepared to testify that the warrantless stop was based on
an anonymous tip predicting whatever conduct the officer just observed." Id.
131. 525 U.S. 113 (1998).
132. In any case, Knowles was not a significant defeat for the police given
Atwater's subsequent holding that police can custodially arrest people for any
offense for which such arrest is allowed under state law and conduct a full search
of the person incident to that arrest under United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S.
218 (1973).
133. 519 U.S. 33 (1996). Although, as discussed infra text accompanying note
151, the Court does not consider asking for consent to search to be an event that
has any Fourth Amendment significance.
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The Court explained both its unwillingness to interfere
with police acting on probable cause and the rare occasions
when it has, in Whren:
Where probable cause has existed, the only cases in which
we have found it necessary actually to perform the
"balancing" analysis involved searches conducted in an
extraordinary manner, unusually harmful to an individual's
privacy or even physical interests-such as, for example,
seizures by means of deadly force, see Tennessee v. Garner,
471 U.S. 1 (1985), unannounced entry into a home, see
Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927 (1995), entry into a home
without a warrant, see Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740
(1984), or physical penetration of the body, see Winston v.
Lee, 470 U. S. 753 (1985).13
Likewise in Kirk v. Louisiana,135 the police were acting
with probable cause that the defendant was selling drugs
from his apartment, but when they knocked on the door of
the apartment, arrested him, and searched him incident to
arrest, with no showing of exigent circumstances, that
search was no good. Obviously probable cause, in
situations where a warrant is also required, is not
sufficient to insulate police from even "rational basis"
scrutiny.
The theme of not interfering with standard police
practices was a common one of the Burger Court. Some
Burger Court decisions with which the current Court would
likely agree are, California v. Trombetta,3 6 in which the
police lab had routinely destroyed breath samples used to
determine blood alcohol levels, and United States v.
Valenzuela-Bernal, ' in which the government had
routinely deported illegal aliens whom the defendant
claimed could have testified in his favor.
134. 517 U.S. at 818. To this short list could be added Wilson v. Layne, 526
U.S. 603 (1999), where execution of an arrest warrant was found unreasonable
because the police took along a newspaper reporter and photographer.
135. 536 U.S. 635 (2002) (per curiam).
136. 467 U.S. 479 (1984).
137. 458 U.S. 858 (1982).
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We might expect the current Court to disagree with, or
at least limit, some of the long line of Burger Court
decisions holding that various investigative behaviors by
police were not "searches" as far as the Fourth Amendment
was concerned. For example, Florida v. Riley13 1 held that
helicopter overflight by police to examine a suspect's
greenhouse in his backyard for marijuana growth was not a
search. This view commanded only a plurality, with
Justice O'Connor concurring in the result only because of
the comparatively high altitude, while suggesting that she
would reach a different result if the flight were lower. Any
attempt to extend Riley to lower altitude overflights would
likely meet the current Court's disapproval. Likewise,
following Kyllo, the Court might be expected to further
limit the use of technology to "snoop" on various aspects of
human behavior, absent a showing of at least
individualized suspicion by police, if not a warrant.
Finally, as noted, Bond's limitation of the "luggage
squeeze" was somewhat inconsistent with Place's approval
of the dog sniff and Edmond ended a trend toward
approving suspicionless stops at roadblocks.
However, this is still an overwhelmingly Republican
Court, and appears likely to remain so indefinitely, so the
overriding Burger Court positions that warrants are
virtually never required for outdoor searches,139 and that
many police investigatory acts, including trash searches,
trespasses onto open fields, etc. are not "searches" at all
under the Fourth Amendment, are not likely to change.
Moreover, there is a potentially disturbing counter-
trend to the Court's moderate Fourth Amendment
tendencies. This is the so-called "special needs" exception
to the warrant, probable cause, and even reasonable
suspicion requirements when a search is not for the
138. 488 U.S. 445 (1989).
139. See Craig M. Bradley, The Court's "Two Model" Approach to the Fourth
Amendment: Carpe Diem!, 84 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 429 (1993) (pointing out
the Court's consistent, with one minor exception, position of requiring warrants
only for searches of structures. This is not, however, a position that has been
explicitly adopted by the Court.).
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purpose of criminal law enforcement, but is aimed at
achieving some other societal goal. As noted above, the
Court's disapproval of governmental tactics in both
Edmond (the drug roadblock case) and Ferguson (the
hospital drug testing case) hinged on the fact that the
information obtained was used to detect ordinary criminal
activity. The Court summarized these special needs cases
in Edmond:
[W]e have upheld certain regimes of suspicionless searches
where the program was designed to served "special needs,
beyond the normal need for law enforcement." See, e.g.,
Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995)
(random drug testing of student-athletes); Treasury
Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989) (drug tests for
United States Customs Service employees seeking transfer
or promotion to certain positions); Skinner v. Railway Labor
Executives' Assn., 489 U.S. 602 (1989) (drug and alcohol
tests for railway employees involved in train accidents or
found to be in violation of particular safety regulations). 4 '
These various "special needs" have generally seemed to
reflect legitimate societal concerns that would be unduly
hindered by the traditional limitations on ordinary law
enforcement work. Indeed, the Court's refusal to extend
the "special needs" doctrine to the drug tests in Ferguson,
despite the non-law enforcement interest in keeping fetuses
drug-free, and to the roadblocks in Edmond despite the
petitioner's attempt to assert "special needs" in that case,""
suggested that the Court was going to be relatively strict in
140. 531 U.S. at 37. (The Court also discusses the roadblocks approved in
earlier cases and distinguished in Edmond, above.) For a detailed discussion of
the civil liberties concerns raised by Skinner and Von Raab (and equally
applicable to subsequent cases), see Stephen Schulhofer, On the Fourth
Amendment Rights of the Law-Abiding Public, 1989 Sup. Ct. Rev. 87. However,
one of Professor Schulhofer's concerns, that the Court "wavers about whether the
absence of a law enforcement objective justifies fewer restrictions of the power to
search," id. at 89, has been definitively resolved by the Court: non-law
enforcement searches can be much broader.
141. 531 U.S. at 41-44.
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extending governmental claims of "special needs" to justify
warrantless, non-probable-cause searches and seizures."
Thus it appears that the Supreme Court has finally
shrugged the Warren Court albatross from its neck in
criminal procedure and is striking out on its own,
developing an area of the law, no-probable-cause
encounters, that has previously not been emphasized or,
when treated, had consistently produced rulings for the
government. A decided trend in these cases has been
described. The Court is extremely reluctant to allow police
to interfere with people as to whom the police lack probable
cause. It scrutinizes police claims of such authority strictly
and generally disallows them. On the other hand, if the
police already are justified in restricting an individual, due,
as in most of the recent cases, to a traffic infraction, or
some other violation, then the Court tends to defer to police
claims that their discretion should not be curbed, as long as
the Court is satisfied that there is a rational basis to their
claim.
The question remains if this is a salutary policy.
Whether the Supreme Court is requiring trial judges to
evaluate police behavior case-by-case in order to determine
reasonableness, or is deciding a "clear rule" to be applied by
the police in all subsequent cases that present this issue,
the bottom line of Fourth Amendment analysis is still the
textual requirement of "reasonableness.""' This in turn
depends upon a weighing of the needs of the police versus
the privacy concerns of the individual. Constitutional
issues can arise as to both individuals who are in, and
those who are not in, legitimate police custody. And while
the concerns of the police and the individual are strongly
142. The recent decision in Board of Education v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002),
expanded the "special needs" rationale to allow school drug testing of all students
who wished to participate in extra-curricular activities. However, this decision
was based largely on the unique relationship between schools and the children
they serve and is not likely to be extended into other areas. Id. at n.3. See
Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305 (1997), where the Court struck down a Georgia
requirement that candidates for public office submit to drug tests.
143. As the Court reiterated in McArthur: "[The Fourth Amendment's] 'central
requirement' is one of reasonableness." 531 U.S. at 330.
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affected by whether the police are acting with probable
cause or not, this should not necessarily be the decisive
factor.
As discussed above, the greatest burden on the
individual in any of the recent cases is in Atwater-being
arrested is a severe intrusion on privacy. Balanced against
this must be the interest of the police in having a clear rule
that they can arrest anyone who commits a crime for which
state law allows an arrest (as opposed to the dissent's
position that the police should have to show some reason to
arrest people for a non-jailable offense). In my view, the
police interest fails in the balance. The indignity of a
custodial arrest and the likelihood that the police will use
minor misdemeanors as a pretext for arresting people
whom they want to investigate for other crimes suggests
that this case should have come out for the defendant. To
require a showing of "some reason" for arrest, as opposed to
allowing police to arrest out of pique, or in hopes of
obtaining evidence of a more serious crime, would not
unduly restrict and confuse the police.
Likewise Whren, with its explicit approval of pretext
arrests for minor offenses to investigate major ones
trenches heavily on privacy interests while not, in my view,
advancing very substantial, or legitimate, police goals.
By contrast the burden on the individual in Morales
was particularly slight-simply being required to move on
by a policeman and being arrested only if one refuses, does
not seem especially onerous, even if the statute is vague
about when police can do this. On the other hand, the law
enforcement interest in dispersing gangs and diluting their
control of neighborhoods seemed strong. Still, the
vagueness concerns in Morales remove it from
straightforward Fourth Amendment reasonableness
analysis.
The thermal imager in Kyllo, while somewhat
disturbing, revealed so little about what went on in the
interior of the house that I would not have been surprised
to see the Court uphold it. But they did not. Likewise, the
roadblock in Edmonds represented a fairly limited
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intrusion on individual autonomy while substantially
contributing to the interdiction of illegal drugs. One would
have expected a Republican Court to have decided these
two cases against defendants before they decided Atwater
and Whren against them.
Since the Court is not weighing the relative burdens
on police and citizens in reaching their conclusions, what
does explain the results? The answer, as noted, seems to
be that the Court is reflecting the concerns of the middle
class who, minding their own business, do not want to be
randomly stopped at a drug roadblock, have their houses
"scanned" by high tech equipment or their urine
surreptitiously examined by hospitals acting in cahoots
with the police. Certainly Bond, with its recognition that
"[passengers] are particularly concerned [with] their carry-
on luggage; they generally use it to [carry] personal
items. .. 144 sounded like the Justices themselves saying,
"Hey, we don't want anybody messing with our carry-on
luggage when we fly." (Bostick and Drayton, by contrast,
raising issues unique to bus, as opposed to plane travel, did
not attract the sympathy of a majority for the defendants'
plight.)
On the other hand, the innocent citizen has no
personal concerns about search warrant execution and,
though he could be taken into custody for a minor traffic
violation under Atwater, the truth of the matter is that he
would not be. (Recall that Atwater, though a "soccer mom,"
was also a recidivist seatbelt violator who was endangering
her children and that the Court nevertheless criticized the
policeman for making the arrest in that particular case.)
Likewise, police would not use an arrest for a minor traffic
violation as a pretext to investigate the "good citizen" for a
more serious offense because she is not likely to be under
suspicion for a more serious offense.
This middle class attitude toward Fourth Amendment
protection is in stark contrast to the Warren Court which,
in some of its most notable cases, limited searches incident
144. Bond, 529 U.S. at 337-38.
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to arrest, 45 required warrants to search the homes of those
suspected of crimes and backed up that requirement with
the exclusionary rule,16  and extended this warrant
protection to a bookmaker making a call from a telephone
booth.4 7 The Warren Court similarly imposed the Miranda
warning requirement on the interrogation of people
arrested on probable cause and threw out numerous
confessions by such arrestees on the ground that they were
involuntary, 48  something neither the Burger nor the
Rehnquist Court has ever done as to a stationhouse
interrogation. 49 (Perhaps they believe that the Miranda
warnings have caused all involuntary confessions to
cease). 50
The Court's middle class orientation toward the
Fourth Amendment can also been seen in its curiously
reasoned consent search cases, most recently illustrated by
the June 2002 case of United States v. Drayton.' In
Drayton, the defendant and a companion, Brown, were
riding on a bus. At a scheduled stop, three police came on
the bus in search of narcotics. The officers testified that
people were free not to cooperate, but rarely refused, and
were not informed of a right to refuse.1 2 Defendant and
Brown were asked if the police could search their bags.
They agreed and the search disclosed nothing. Brown was
then asked if the police could search his person. He agreed
145. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
146. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
147. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
148. See, e.g., Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964); Rogers v. Richmond,
365 U.S. 534 (1961); Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433 (1961); Culombe v. Connecticut,
367 U.S. 568 (1961).
149. In Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978), the Court excluded a confession
taken in the intensive care ward after the suspect had invoked his right to
counsel. In Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991), the Court excluded a
confession made in prison to an informant who told the suspect that he would
protect him from the other inmates only if he told the truth about the crime.
150. It's true that the Burger Court in particular devoted a large number of
cases to discussing the scope of the Miranda rights of arrested individuals, but
this was obviously in an effort to limit the broad impact of Miranda, not to extend
additional protections to arrestees.
151. 536 U.S. 194 (2002).
152. Id. at 198.
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and, when they patted his thighs, they felt "hard objects
similar to drug packages detected on other occasions."'53
Brown was arrested.
Drayton was then asked if he consented to a search of
his person. He likewise agreed, and similar packages were
found on him, leading to his arrest. The Court first found
that Drayton was not "seized" when consent to search was
sought, and then turned to the issue of whether his consent
was voluntary. It is on this point that their middle class
point of view shines through so clearly.
The Court points out that "[n]othing Officer Lang said
indicated a command to consent to the search."' '54 They
discuss how Lang "asked permission to check" their bags
and "asked... if they objected" to a search of their person.
Thus, if the police are polite and non-threatening, and if
the person has not been found to be "seized," then the
consent is okay.
But obviously this consent was not "voluntary" in any
ordinary sense of the word. Since a search of Drayton's
person would inevitably lead to discovery and arrest,
Drayton fervently did not want the police to search him.
The only possible explanation for his consent, and those of
the thousands of other suspects who know that consent will
lead to arrest, is that they feel they have no choice. If they
refuse consent, the police will find a way to search them
anyway, and may rough them up in the process. And
there's the slim hope (virtually nonexistent in Drayton, but
more realistic in auto stop cases) that if they seem
cooperative, the police will go away without bothering to
search. These are not voluntary choices.'55
But from the point of view of the "good citizen," they
are. Since he has nothing to hide, he doesn't mind if the
police look in his bag to advance the greater good of drug
interdiction (as some passengers in Drayton explicitly told
153. Id.
154. Id. at 206.
155. For a fuller discussion of the problems with consent search doctrine, see,
Craig M. Bradley, The Court's Curious Consent Doctrine, Trial Mag., October, 1,
2002, at 72.
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the police).1 6 As the Court declared in Florida v. Bostick,157
an earlier bus search case, "the appropriate inquiry is
whether a reasonable person would feel free to decline the
officers' requests or otherwise terminate the encounter."
"Reasonable person" means "innocent person."15 But the
"reasonable, innocent person" is not transporting drugs.
Indeed, since he needn't fear arousing the suspicions of the
police, he may feel more free to decline the request than the
guilty person.' But why, the Court evidently reasons,
need we be concerned with the rights of people who are
transporting drugs, as long as the "reasonable person"
doesn't feel misused by the police?
Drayton and the other consent cases may be thought to
be inconsistent with the major theme of this article-that
the Court will not allow the police to hassle apparently
innocent people. Drayton was, after all, just minding his
own business on a bus when the police came along. But
this is not how the Court views these cases. When someone
is stopped at a roadblock, has her urine examined, is forced
to move on, or has his house scanned by a thermal imager,
the police have engaged in a Fourth Amendment act-
either a search or seizure. But the basis of the Court's
result in Drayton was that there was no seizure. Had there
been, the consent would have been invalid. Instead, the
police activity in Drayton was viewed as "approaching [an
individual] on the street or in other public places and
putting questions to them if they are willing to listen."16 0
That is not considered a seizure and, as the Court noted, is
a police activity that the reasonable good citizen is
generally happy to cooperate with. Such "voluntary
cooperation" is not deemed to require Fourth Amendment
scrutiny by the Court.
156. "In Lang's experience, however, most people are willing to cooperate.
Some passengers go so far as to commend the police for their efforts to ensure the
safety of their travel." Id. at 198.
157. 501 U.S. 429, 436 (1991).
158. Id. at 437-38.
159. "Lang could recall five to six instances in the previous year in which
passengers declined to have their luggage searched." Drayton, 536 U.S. at 198.
160. Id. at 200.
2003] MIDDLE CLASS FOURTH AMENDMENT 1161
In conclusion, the Court is to be applauded for its
concern that police, if unchecked, will expand their powers
to investigate crime in ways that are incompatible with a
free society and would seriously interfere with the rights of
law abiding citizens. Likewise, the Court's reluctance to
micro-manage police treatment of suspects who are
legitimately in custody is frequently wise. However, the
Court must recognize that people in custody, or people who
engage in activity that would justify custody, are also
uniquely vulnerable, and police enthusiasm for trenching
on their rights is especially keen. Accordingly, a certain
amount of "finicking" about the rights of those people
should still be on the Supreme Court's agenda. The status
of the individual vis-&-vis the police should not be the
deciding factor. The reasonableness of the search should
be.

